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This paper attempts to help explain the unforecasted, “excess” personal income tax revenues
of the last several years.  Using panel data on executive compensation in the 1990s, it argues that
because the gains on most stock options are treated as ordinary income for tax purposes, rising stock
market valuations are directly tied to non-capital gains income.  This blurred line between capital
and wage income for has affected tax revenue in three ways, at least for these high-income people.
First, stock performance has directly affected the amount of ordinary income that people report by
influencing their stock option exercise decisions.  Second, the presence of options gives executives
more flexibility in changing the timing of their reported income and appears to make them much
more sensitive to the short-run timing of tax changes, even accounting for the stock market changes
of the period.  Third, because of the tax rules on options, changing the capital gains tax rate, as the
U.S. did in the late 1990s, can lead individuals to exercise their options early to convert the expected
future gains into lower-taxed forms.  The data show significant evidence of each of these effects and
in all three cases, executives working in the ‘new’ economy and high-technology sectors, show
decidedly greater responses.  
Austan Goolsbee







Recent years have been trying times for revenue estimators.  Unexpectedly large tax revenues 
have pleased voters but created substantial uneasiness about whether the increases are temporary 
or if they are somehow the result of a permanently ‘new’ economy.  There is a nagging sense 
that somehow the unprecedented boom in the stock market is responsible.  Although rising stock 
values can explain major increases in capital gains tax revenue, the forecasts have also seriously 
understated ordinary income, as well, particularly at the top of the income distribution (for 
discussions of the literature on taxes and high-income people see Slemrod, 1998 or Goolsbee 
1999, 2000a). 
This paper argues that among high-income executives at least, there has been a noticeable 
blurring of the lines between capital and wage income from 1991 to 1998 and that this blurring is 
particularly pronounced in the high-technology sector as one might expect given the prevalence 
of stock options in those sectors or even from previous results on the tax sensitivity of high-tech 
demand (see Hausman, 1998; Goolsbee 2000b).  This connects stock market gains with increase 
in ordinary income.  
The data show three things about the relationship between ordinary income and capital 
income.  First, as discussed in Huddart (1999) and Hall and Liebman (2000), rising stock prices 
lead to greater option exercise.  While intuitive, because most stock option gains are treated as 
ordinary income, this creates a direct connection between stock market gains and ordinary 
income and the magnitude is large.  Second,  capital income is known to be especially sensitive 
to short-run and expected changes to tax policy (see Burman and Randolph, 1995).  The data 
here update the work of Goolsbee (2000c) and show that because of the presence of options, 
ordinary income of executives was extremely sensitive to anticipated rate changes in the early 
1990s, particularly for high-tech executives.  Third, there is a direct connection between capital gains tax rates and ordinary income.  Falling capital gains rates in 1997 increased the probability 
of exercising options early to get future stock gains treated as capital gains, again especially for 
‘new’ economy executives. 
 
II. DATA ON EXECUTIVES 
The primary data on executive compensation in this paper come from the EXECUCOMP 
database of Standard and Poor’s.  These data report the compensation of the five highest paid 
executives for all companies in the S & P 500 Index, the Mid-cap 400 index and the small-cap 
600 index from 1991 to 1996 (data used later in the paper to account for changes in the capital 
gains tax rate provide further information on 1997 and 1998).  More details on these data can be 
found in Goolsbee (2000c).  I restrict the sample to executives at firms with a December fiscal 
year so as to match the tax year. 
The firms are required to report on the compensation of their executives in numerous 
categories.  Several of these categories are normally taxable as ordinary (wage and salary type) 
income including salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts (a long-term bonus) and the 
value of stock options exercised.  For the most common type of option (Non-Qualified), the 
difference between the exercise price and the strike price is treated as ordinary income at the 
time of exercise and deductible by the firm.  Further appreciation in the stock is treated as capital 
gains.  Two of the categories include income that is, in general, not taxable.  These are the Black-
Scholes value of options granted (data starts in 1992) and “other” income (primarily perquisites, 
and the like).     
  In 1996, the average compensation package for these executives was more than $1.2 million 
and taxable compensation was more than $1 million—clearly high income.  Fortunately, because the data are not restricted to CEOs and not restricted exclusively to large companies, there are 
numerous executives with high but not extraordinarily high incomes and this creates variation in 
the magnitude of the tax changes facing executives within individual years. 
These data provide consistent information on a large number of high-income people over 
time but their major drawback is that they do not report the executive’s total income, only their 
income coming from the firm.  As a result, I will take reported taxable components of 
compensation as the individual’s taxable income assuming a small amount of other income.  To 
avoid endogeneity in determining the tax rates, I use a measure of permanent income to calculate 
the marginal rates following Goolsbee (2000c).  To these data on compensation, I add 
information on the annual return on holding equity in the executive’s company using the monthly 
return data from CRSP as well as total market value information given in EXECUCOMP. 
 
III. STOCK RETURNS, INCOME TAX RATES, AND TAXABLE INCOME 
The basic specification will explain the log of taxable income (i.e., sum of the taxable forms 
of compensation) as a function of the log of one minus the current and the future marginal tax 
rates, the log of one minus the corporate tax rate for firms in excess of the “deductibility cap” 
(see Goolsbee, 2000c for the definition), the log of real market value of the firm, and year 
dummies.  The inclusion of year dummies means that the regressions are identified off of the 
cross-sectional change in tax rates within year (i.e., higher versus lower income executives).  The 
specification for 1991 to 1996 is listed in column 1 of table 2.  
Almost all of the variables are significant.  As in Huddart (1999) and Hall and Liebman 
(2000), past returns have an important impact on reported ordinary income (no capital gains are 
included), as does market value.   The magnitudes suggest that a one time firm return of .20 would increase ordinary income by 11.2 percent in the first year, growing to a total of 17.5 
percent two years later and eventually settling down at 8 percent (because market value rose).  
The increased income arising from option exercise, however, is simultaneously deducted by 
the firm, however, so the revenue impact is not as large as it appears.  Using the estimated 
marginal tax rates for these firms from Graham and Lemmon (1998), the average corporate rate 
for these executives was .255.  The revenue impact on ordinary income would, therefore, not be 
.396 times the increase in income but rather the difference between .396 and the corporate rate 
(i.e., .141) times the increase in income.  Even still, given the market performance of the last few 
years, this is a potentially rather dramatic link between stock performance and ordinary income.  
The results in column 1 also confirm that there is an intense short-run sensitivity to tax 
changes.  The tax increases under Clinton were expected in advance and executives appear to 
have responded in anticipation.  The short-run elasticity of income is about one but the non-
transitory (sum of the two coefficients) is close to zero and not significant.  Hall and Liebman 
(2000) show that in their sample (from 1990 to 1994 and exclusively drawn from CEOs of 
fortune 500 companies), including past stock returns eliminates the evidence of short-run timing 
shifts but this is not true in this larger data set which supports the results in Goolsbee (2000c). 
Column 2 shows that the short run sensitivity to marginal rates comes exclusively from stock 
options.  The dependent variable in this column is taxable income excluding options exercised 
and there is almost no role for tax policy (and past returns have much smaller effects, too).  
Next, I examine whether new economy executives behave differently than others, comparing 
high-technology industries (aerospace, biotechnology, communications equipment, cellular and 
telephone companies, computer equipment, software and services, electronics, and photography 
and imaging) with all others.  The average compensation in the two sectors was approximately equal ($1.3 million for high-tech, $1.2 million for others in 1996) but with a greater emphasis on 
stock options.  The results in columns 3 and 4 show marked differences between the two industry 
types.  The short run elasticity of income with respect to the net of tax share for high-tech 
executives exceeds 3.5(!).  The short run elasticity for the old economy executives is closer to .8.  
The non-transitory impacts are not significantly different from zero in either regression. 
 
IV. CAPITAL GAINS RATES AND ORDINARY INCOME 
  The final impact of blurring lines between ordinary and capital income is that it 
potentially creates a link between capital gains rates and reported ordinary income.  If true, part 
of the unexpected revenue in 1997 and 1998 may arise from the capital gains rate reductions 
beginning in 1997.  As Huddart (1999) shows, if capital gains rates fall while personal rates 
remain constant, some executives will have an incentive to exercise their stock options early in 
order to get future stock price accumulations taxed at the more favorable capital gains rate rather 


















whereR ˆ  is the expected future appreciation rate if the stock, r is the individual’s borrowing cost, 
τ is the personal tax rate, τcg is the capital gains rate, Px is the exercise price and P0 is the strike 
price (this rule ignores the deduction available to the firm from the option exercise).  IfR ˆ >0, the 
derivative of the right hand side is negative and is decreasing in the expected future gain (i.e., 
cutting the capital gains rate raises the r.h.s. and makes early exercise more likely and this effect 
is greater the larger is the expected future gain).    Preliminary evidence on the subject using the updated EXECUCOMP data from 1997 
and 1998 suggest that this cross-impact of capital gains rates on ordinary income may have been 
important.  The capital gains tax rate for these executives fell from 28 percent to 20 percent in 
1997.  Column 1 of Table 4 reports the results from a linear probability that the executive 
exercises options in the given year as a function of current, past and future stock returns, one 
minus the capital gains tax rate, this capital gains rate term interacted with stock returns in the 
subsequent year (implicitly assuming that high-level executives had accurate expectations of 
future returns), a time trend, a dummy indicating whether the executive exercised stock options 
in the previous year, and individual dummies for all executives that received any stock options in 
the period (1992 to 1998).  There is no cross-sectional variation in the capital gains tax rate so 
the regression does not include year dummies.  The results indicate that executives were 
significantly more likely to exercise options when the capital gains tax rate fell and significantly 
more so for those working at firms with larger future appreciations.   
Column 2 adds year dummies.  This eliminates the capital gains tax rate term on its own 
but the interaction term remains identified and is still significant and very close to its previous 
value. Moving from a capital gains rate of .28 to .20 in 1997 increases the probability of exercise 
for an executive working at a firm with the mean annual log return (return of .169) by 5 percent 
from .37 to about .39.  For an executive at a firm with returns one standard deviation higher 
(return of .526), the probability rises by about 15 percent from .37 to almost .43. 
Columns 3 and 4 divide up the sample into high-tech executives (column 3) and others 
(column 4).  Here again, the new economy executives seem to respond much more to tax 
changes than do the old economy executives.  The coefficient on the capital gains interaction 
term indicates that capital gains rates have almost double the impact in the high-tech sector. This cross-tax effect of capital gains on ordinary income has not been examined in previous work and 
may be important for understanding the estimated responses of income to tax changes such as the 




The rise of stock options and their prevalence in high-technology industries mean that recent 
years have blurred the line between capital and wage income.  For executives in the 1990s, high 
stock returns lead to significant increases in ordinary income through high option exercise and 
bonuses.  The presence of options also made executives particularly sensitive to expectations 
about future tax changes, especially in high-tech industries.  Changing capital gains tax rates also 
appear to have had direct effects on ordinary income.  The growing importance of options in the 
economy and the rising role of high-technology industries mean that the blurring of wage and 
capital income is likely to continue to complicate revenue estimation in the years to come.   
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  The sample is 1991 to 1996.  The dependent variable 
is taxable income in (1), (3) and (4) and taxable income minus options exercised in column (2).  
The subscript indicates the year of the variable.  The personal tax rate is τ , [Deduct.] is an 
indicator variable for non-deductibility of the executive’s pay and τ c is the corporate tax rate. All 
the equations include year and individual dummies and a separate income trend for people with 
permanent income greater than $275,000.  
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Notes: The dependent variable is a {0,1} of whether the executive exercises options in the 
given year.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample period is 1992 to 1997.  The exercise 
dummy is a one if the executive exercised options in the previous year. REFERENCES 
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